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Abstract 
In this paper I examine the various pre-merger conditions necessary for a merger and 
acquisition activity to be successful. I have done this by analyzing information from a 
sample of random companies and then looking at factors such as the merger value, the 
long term debt to income ratio, the average pre merger earnings per share and the long 
term asset-income ratio of the companies The results of my analysis shows that a higher 
value of merger leads to failure of the merger, the higher value of asset-income ratio 
leads to a successful merger. Higher debt Income ratio increases chances of failure. I take 
into account strictly these pre-merger conditions for the acquiring company. 
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I-Introduction 
Past indicates that or more all TnP'rcrl"r and activity to 
create any significant shareholder The is that most acquisitions 
place the capitalization of a particular company at and in return deliver 
small Analysts estimated 70% of fail. A study by KPM03 
found value to combined companies, produced no 
and 53% destroyed value. 83% of all rn"'r"""r~' failed to 
produce business benefits as shareholder value. It is important to look at the 
pre condition that will to the success or failure of merger. 
I examine four nr"'_rYII'''r,rrpr factors that might affect success of merger. 
factor I look at is of the I expect that the the merger should affect 
overall performance. Although mergers are supposed to synergies, 
mergers not by these cost As a matter of fact, too big a 
may lead to the cost Vv'~UU'0v of its of The 
factor I look at is per share. Higher company earnings 
share higher profitabjJity company. A company with high 
share is expected to do well the merger. pre-merger financial health of the' 
company determines the success failure of a One indicator of 
financial is the asset-income ratio. A asset/income is 
financial health to one with low ratio. Hence, I 
hypothesize companies with a pre-merger asset-income ratio has a 
chance of post-merger success than one with low asset-income The fourth factor 
1 McKinsey 2001 Number I "Deals that create value". 
Schleier, 'The World's Greatest Masters of M&A" 
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I examine for the pre-merger financial health of a company is debt-income ratio. A higher 
debt-income ratio signifies a poor financial health of the company. So I expect that 
companies with a lower debt-income ratio have a lower chance of success in the post-
merger period. 
In this paper, I first give a brief introduction about mergers and acquisitions. J state 
what the different types of mergers and acquisitions are and then discuss the different 
merger waves and their importance. My empirical analysis, however, is based strictly on 
the fifth and the latest wave. In the next section I discuss the various motivations for 
mergers and acquisitions taking into account synergy and diversification. I then go on to 
discuss the theory behind successful and unsuccessful mergers. Finally, I present my 
empirical analysis including my data, methodology, analysis and regression tables. 
4 
II -Background on Mergers 
A merger is a combination of two corporations in which only one corporation survives 
and the merged corporation goes out of existence. In a merger, the acquiring company 
assumes the assets and liabilities of the merged company. This can also be called a 
statutory merger. This is different from a subsidiary merger where the target company 
becomes a subsidiary or part of a subsidiary of the parent company. An example of a 
subsidiary merger is the acquisition of Electronic Data System by General Motors led by 
CEO Ross Perot. In a merger the acquiring firm retains its name and its identity, and it 
acquires all of the assets and liabilities of the acquired firm. After a merger, the acquired 
firm ceases to exist as a separate business entity. 
In a consolidation, a business combination takes place whereby two or more 
companies join to form an entirely new company. Both the acquiring firm and the 
acquired firm terminate their previous legal existence and become part of the new firm. 
Here the distinction between the acquiring firm and the acquired firm is not important. 
However, the rules for mergers and acquisition are basically the same. An example of this 
could the formation of Bank of America in 1998 whereby BankAmerica, based out of 
San Francisco and Nations bank based in Charlotte, fonned Bank of America. Another 
example is the combination of computer manufacturers Burroughs and Sperry in 1986 to 
form UNISYS. In a consolidation the original stockholders of the merging companies 
become stockholders of the new company. Although mergers and consolidations are 
different terms, they are often used interchangeably. In the industry, when two firms are 
of equal size, the term consolidation can be used. When the two firms differ in size, the 
word merger is more often used. Another term that is used is takeover. This refers to 
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transactions and can mean some friendly deals. It is therefore regarded as a 
term to of control of a firm from one group of 
shareholder to another. A finn that 
referred to as the bidder. The bidder 
assets of another company. If the 
over its stock or assets to the bidder in 
or cash). 
History of Mergers and acquisitions 
To understand the importance of 
the history of mergers and acquisition. In the 
to over 
it is 
have taken place. Understanding waves IS important in 
major transitions that provoked business 
growth. The first wave was between 1897 
firm is usually 
to obtain the stock or 
will up 
to see 
]904, 
its 
a sense of 
activity 
to understand the 
wave 
19]6 the third wave between ] 965 and 1969 and the fourth wave 
] 984 and 1989. The latest wave appeared at the beginning of the 1990s. 
wave arose with the end of a depression era (1883) and with 
from the National Bureau of Economic Research indicates that 
(chemicals, transportation, machinery, bituminous coal, food 
products, primary metals and petroleum products) had 
wave mergers were predominantly horizontal in nature. This 
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often gave rise to monopolistic market structure. As a result of this, this period is 
highlighted as the monopolistic era. Another highlight of this era is the first billion dollar 
merger when J.P. Morgan's U.S. Steel joined Carnegie Steel. founded by Carnegie Steel. 
The resulting companies also merged with 785 other firms. Some of the other industrial 
giants of today's age were also formed by mergers in this era. Examples of such 
companies would be General Electric, Dupont Inc., Eastman Kodak, American Tobacco 
Inc. These companies enjoyed tremendous market share even by the end of the first 
merger wave. 
An important thing to be noted here is that a majority of the mergers in this era failed. 
The many horizontal combinations that took place in the first wave were an attempt to 
achieve economies of scale. Through mergers and acquisitions the expanding economies 
sought to increase their efficiency by lower per-unit costs. 
For example at one time U.S. Steel accounted for 75% of the United State's steel-
making capacity. Standard Oil (owned by J.D. Rockefeller) had an 85% market share and 
American Tobacco had a 95% market share. As a result of the monopolistic mergers with 
industries, the 100 largest industrial corporations controlled 185 of the assets of all 
industrial corporations. Measures were taken to control such monopolistic acts, but then 
proved fruitless. The Sherman Antitrust Act4 (1890) did not help curb acquisitions. The 
justice department was more geared towards Jabor unions. 
4 The Sherman Act made the formation of monopolies and other attempts to restrain trade, unlawful and 
criminal offenses punishable under federal law. The first two section contain important provisions. 
Section I: This section prohibits all contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. 
Section 2: This section prohibits any attempts or conspiracies to monopolize a particular industry. 
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The Second wave is similar to the first wave as many consolidations took place in this 
wave as well. After boom, a lot of capital was 
available by the waiting securities set stage for the 
marker The antitrust environment of the 1920s however was a lot 
one merger wave. became aware Sherman 
was not effective and launched the Clayton of 19145• Whereas merger 
wave gave rise to horizontal mergers, the wave gave rise to It 
produced and more Many in unrelated 
started following industries experienced the most amount 
in this era. Primary Petroleum products, 
Transportation In a way the 
to enhance 's productivity as war effort. mentioned 
market end the second wave (October 29th , ) Another 
this era was that investment Bankers during this as 
role in merger activities. The number of rrl"'r(T,pr'" that took 
those demonstrates that bankers activities. 
Because a booming economy during the third wave, a historical 
place. The firms that were formed as a 
diversified. were which conducted businesses in 
5 The goal of the Act was to the Sherman Act while also specifically proscribing certain 
business IJH',,"'''v,",,''. The Clayton Act clarified which business practices unfairly restrain trade and reduces 
competition. 
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industries. There was also a lot of pressure form the antitrust regulation environment such 
as the Cel1er-Kefauver Act6 of the] 950s. Wel1 known conglomerates such as ITT and 
LTV were formed during this period. Towards the end of this wave, Richard Nixon was 
elected and a freer market orientation was implemented. The Supreme Court began to use 
broad international market view as opposed to a more narrow domestic or even regional 
market definition. 
The Fourth Wave, 1981-89 
In the fourth wave a number of hostile mergers took place. Takeovers are considered 
friendly or hostile depending on the target firm's reaction to the merger. Another factor to 
consider during this wave was the significant percentage of the total dol1ar volume of 
mergers and acquisitions. It really was a wave of mega mergers. The number of $100 
million transactions increased more than 23 times from] 974 to 1986. This differed from 
the conglomerate era of ] 960s where small and medium sized businesses were being 
acquired. In this wave the term corporate raiders originated. The corporate raider tried to 
originate its income from takeover attempts. Paul Bilzerian was known for his corporate 
raids. He acquired Singer Corporation in 1988. Mergers also proved to be a great source 
of risk free advisory for investment bankers. The magnitude of these fees reached 
unprecedented proportions. The aggressive style of investment bankers in pursuing 
mergers and acquisition was crucial in the growth of investment bankers. Another feature 
of this period was the increased use of debt which was used to finance mega deals. This is 
a reason why small companies were able to bid for comparatively large firms. Leveraged 
6 The Celler-Kefauver Act prohibited the acquisition of assets of a target firm when the effect was to lessen 
competition. It also prohibited vertical mergers and conglomerate mergers when they were shown to reduce 
competition. 
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Buyout became a common phrase in the Wall Street. In 1990 the economy went into a 
brief mild recession which pretty much ended the fourth recession. This era also ended 
because of the collapse of the junk bond market, which had provided for many of the 
LBO deals. 
The Fifth Wave 
We again saw an abundance of huge deals in 1992. This gave rise to our final wave 
which still continues. This wave saw fewer hostile takeovers and more mega merges. The 
economy recovered from the 1990-199] recession and the companies began to seek to 
expand and mergers were seen as a quick and easy way to do that. In this deal, however, 
strategy became an important part of the merger deal rather than a quick financial gain. 
They were financed through the increased use of equity which resulted in less heavily 
leveraged combinations. The large amount of consolidation deals were known as roll-ups. 
Fragmented industries were consolidated through larger scale acquisitions of companies 
that were called consolidators. This occurred particularly in the floral products, office 
products and funeral business. Another feature of this wave was that it was truly 
international in nature. By 1999, the value of deals in Europe was almost as large as in 
United States. Within Europe Britain accounted for the largest number of deals followed 
by Germany and France. In Asia, the majority of the deals were made in Japan. 
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The top ten worldwide and 
Announced Acquirer Value 
l.Nov. I 999 June 2000 Vodafone Air Mannesman AG $ 
2Jan. 2000 Jan. 2001 America Online Warner $ 1 
Jun 2000 Pfizer Inc. Warner-Lambert $ 
Nov 1999 Exxon Corp. Mobil Corp. $ 
2000 Glaxo Well come SmithKline Beechman $ 76.0 
1998 Citicorp $ 
1999 Ameritech Corp. $ 
2000 Nortel Networks Corp. $ 61.7 
9.Aprl 1 1998 BankAmerica Corp. $ 61.6 
lOJan.l Jun 1999 AirTouch Communication $ 60.3 
7Gaughan, MP,"(>Plr~ And Corporate 
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III·Reasons for Mergers·Synergy 
a 
are continuously looking for 
between internal growth 
to and develop. They are 
While 
might be a very slow process, growth tnl"ro,pr" is a more rapid process. While a 
might grow slowly 
and take market share. to 
competitors might respond 
share is to acquire another 
and management in place. that 
the 
balance as in 
with an 
and an 
more 
profitable than 
and misused 
The main 
resources such as market 
factors behind any 
fail to reach any expected 
and do not understand the after 
unworkable in practice. They don't 
case of G.E's attempt to acquire 
deal is expected synergy. 
companies focus on 
Their grand 
Banking firm 
culture. This synergy, if rp{"r. ern as both a "science 
qu successfully. Let's now 
phenomenon when a 
synergy in a little 
combination is more 
parts of the firm that were combined. 
combining two firms. It is both 
words, it is 
most widely used 
that can achieved are operational 
Operational synergies are synergies that allow firms to 
income, growth or IS a for operating in one form 
or the other, in many would categorize operating as revenue 
~ Jack Welch the gut. 
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enhancing or cost reducing. The way to Revenue enhancing operating 
synergy is to use the definition "a product or service that 
is formulated by the fusion of two and which 
generates immediate and/or long term revenue ,,9 One of the primary motivators 
for synergy is greater revenues two separately. This may 
come in the forms of sharing of opportunities cross marketing each 
company's products. There are that synergies can be 
achieved. A company with a name reputation to an upcoming 
product line a partner. A company with a strong distribution network may 
with a fiml that has of but not sufficient ability to 
to enhancing synergies, however, are difficult to 
many sources. The reason is that they are difficult to 
For this reason Cost related synergies are 
highlighted in rnAro<'r 
come through economies of scale - decreases in per unit 
cost the size or scale of a company's operations. 
per unit costs for low 
facilities is 
as output level rises, the per unit costs 
overhead. This term can be used with rATA,-<,nr''''' 
as corporate headquarters, top management and a 
sources of these gains arise from increased 
This is Clemente and Greenspan's definition from their book 
Guide to Market-Focused Planning and Integration. 
of output. fixed cost 
of 
known as 
facilities 
Other 
The 
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the more efficient use of capital equipment. Several mergers are motivated by the pursuit 
of scale. We can see evidence of this in the cruise industry, which has undergone a series 
of consolidating mergers and acquisitions. The 1989 acquisition of Sitmar Cruises by 
Princess Cruises and the ] 994 merger between Radisson Diamond Cruises and seven 
Seas Cruises enabled the combined cruise lines to offer an expanded product line in the 
fornl of more ships, beds, and itineraries while lowering per-bed costs. An important 
concept to understand with close relation to economies of scale is economies of scope. 
This is a fiml's ability to successfully utilize one set of inputs to produce a more 
diversified range of products. This happens quiet often in the banking Industry. When 
Banking fiffi1s merge they can share their inputs to offer a broader range of services, such 
as trust departments, consumer investment products unit, or economic analysis group. 
Smaller banks might not be able to afford the costs of these departments. Inputs such as 
computer system may be shared to process a wide variety of loans and deposit accounts. 
Whether these benefits are either the true reason or a sufficient reason for the increased 
number of banking mergers that have taken place is a difficult issue to understand. lO 
Financial Synergy 
An important reason for mergers and acquisitions IS expected financial synergy. 
Financial synergies implication in a merger activity comes m teffi1S of cost of capital. 
Cost of capital is generally lowered with the amount of financial synergy that exists in the 
combination. This is because the cost of issuing securities is subject to economies of 
scale. Professor Aswath Damodran mentions that with financial synergies, the payoff can 
take the fOffi1 of either higher cash flows or a lower cost of capital. He states that when 
10 Patrick Gaughan, Financial Deregulation. Banking Merger and the Impact on Regional business. 
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two entities combine, sources of cash and income consistent 
This makes a stronger in market, allowing to borrow more they 
as individual increasing debt capacity a major 
tax benefit. 
two may risk if the flow streams are not perfectl y 
or merger lowers volatility of the flows, suppliers 
capital may risk of would presumably 
less, swings up and down the combined flows 
would be less likely. implies that it is likely that cash would fall so low 
that the finn become technically insolvent. insolvency occurs a 
finn cannot meet its current obligations as they come due. Technical insolvency may 
occur even when total assets exceed liabilities. Another more serious form of 
business occurs when liabilities exceed total assets and the net worth is 
This effect is dubbed as debt I. If the correlation of the 
income streams of two Finns is less than ,",""'C'T",,~r positive correlated, the bankruptcy 
associated with the combination may reduced. certain 
circumstances one of conditions that it into bankruptcy. 
It is difficult to in advance one of two UV,:>':WLJI'- will experience 
Debt-coinsurance effect not create any new value merely gaIns 
among providers of to the firm. show that stockholders' losses may 
be offset by new debt after The stockholder will then gain the 
tax on the debt payments. The debt would the debt-
II This word is derived from the Journal of Finance 30 "Corporate bankruptcy and Conglomerate 
Mergers," written by and Lawrence Schall. 
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ratio of the post 
or at least 
to a level that stockholders must have found 
benefits can arise either from the 
use of net operating losses to shelter 
money-losing firm may be able to use 
tax burden. Alternatively, a firm that is 
IS 
will save in taxes, and 
T<lr"TA'-C discussed earlier was 
cost decreases. But 
advantage of tax laws or 
a profitable firm that a 
the latter to reduce its 
its depreciation charges after an 
transaction costs and floatation. Many 
through acquisitions. This 
of scale are also possible in 
when companies combine 
acquIre 
with excess cash or cash slack. Thus, 
could not be able to. This is most 
firms or when public companies acquire 
are 
to 
to in projects 
firms 
Thus far we 
for a potential 
reason is 
significantl y 
( conglomerate is 
benefit of economies of economic motive 
can be contributed to the possibility diversification. This 
opinions. Although many gained 
have regretted tremendously. wave 
considered a good indication of 
mergers and acquisitions. When companies acquire other it causes a 
term financial gain to company due to some kind 
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accounting procedures. This financial or more as a financial save is 
short and causes the acquiring finn's to while adding little real 
value through the exchange. 
So why do companies want to 
finance classes in that putting all our 
Companies diversify for same reason 
we see that companies are often 
whatever is common to all 
business. One of the greatest chal 
Many have argued that 
Although 
businesses who 
what 
diversification 
acquisition. We know a success of a 
to 
first things that we learn in our 
~u<.'n~. can lead to a great deal of risk. 
When we analyze this closely 
is systematic risk or 
or whatever is specific to 
TnP,rn,>r activity is reducing systematic 
is an impossible task to Qf'r-nrn 
to some degrees it is often seen in very 
or a particular industry. Unsystematic risk is 
Although it is a proven fact that 
fail to see the need for this in a or 
or acquisition can be contributed to what 
happens to 
few days 
value the action has been announced in the a 
and analysts argue that jf the motive is to 
shareholders that they are much better off to by equity 
from in the stock market. 
reason for diversification can be when compan enter are 
more profitable in the long tenn than the current 
is a lack of assurance that those profit opportunities will an 
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time in the because a or industry can profitable now not 
in the future. According to Economic theory companies that find it difficult to enter or 
pose amounts of risk will have the most amounts of long term In a sense 
that a method to or with companies with low 
barriers to or with profitable returns in run might not to be as 
in the long run. can be justified by fact that such an industry with low 
to entry will to most companies trying to diversify. Therefore to 
increase in the price of companies might up substantially acquiring 
may be forced to pay a substantial premIUm. The number 
competitors may cut down expected returns and cause a failure. 
A bad reason merger and can hubris l2 . Hubris is 
pride or ego of the This implies that managers seek to firms for 
own personal that the pure "'F'I'.nl'"rn gains to acquiring firm are not 
sole motivation or even the motivation in the 
can firms to do a poor job of diligence or to 
hubris 
relevant information that 
might otherwise unravel a This is underlying reason why managers end up 
paying a are some determinants takeovers. the 
firm pays a premium the bid firm the stock market price for target firm 
go up. This may be true since the acquiring firm pay a premium in excess 
of the to the second of hubris. The 
acquiring firm The market the share holders are not 
price 
for the 
by Richard Roll in 'The Hubris H'''''HrIO of Corporate Takeovers," Journal of Business 59. 
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deal and may oppose it. This along with the added disapproval of the board members may 
disapprove the firm. The total effect of the rising value of the acquired firm and the 
decreased value of the acquiring firm is always negative. This is because the acquiring 
firm has to take of several operating agencies and costs to make sure the integration takes 
place. A classic example of this can be found in the RJR Nabisco takeover. It is often said 
that this incident is the closest thing that Wall Street came to a World WarJ3. It had 
companies like Credit Suisse and Kohlberg Kravis along with the board members of RJR 
participate in it. 
13 Bryan Burrough. Barbarians at the Gate. 
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IV -Reasons for 
With the reason comes the 
noted that there is no clear model a 
out the odds of success. It should be 
will fail or succeed. Several factors 
as economic discrepancies and unknown cultural differences make it difficult to 
measure any successful or unsuccessful 
rarely will anyone attribute, on its own 
It should also be noted that 
to success. Many firms such as GE, 
and Browning Ferris have increased value over by Researchers 
transactions between have examined this issue. Parrino and 
1987 and categorized the firms 
at the transaction, and the motive for 
is replaced 
They found that in the 
more than the industry after the transaction, 2.1 
found that almost all this excess return in cases where the 
is replaced within one year In most of these cases 
of merged firms was replaced within one 
of the combined firms continued in place 
industry. 
firms 
firm did not do 
Let's examine some 
underlying reason 
successful ""'",,.,,."",.,, 
1996 to 1998 states 
28% more likely to 
in this area specificalJy. I that 
This can also be applied in the case of 
by KPMG of the 700 largest from 
synergy carefully before an acquisition are 
that do not. They also state that cost 
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synergies associated with reducing the number of employees are more likely to be 
accomplished than new product development or research and development synergies. For 
instance, only a quarter to a third of firms succeeded on the latter, whereas 66% of firms 
were able to reduce headcount after mergers. 
A study done by McKinsey brings important insight into this matter. This study finds 
that the market apparently prefers deals that are part of an "expansionist" program, in 
which a company seeks to boost its market share by consolidating, by moving into new 
geographic regions, or by adding new distribution channels for existing products and 
services. The market seems to be less tolerant of transformative deals, those that seek to 
move companies into new lines of business or to remove a chunk of an otherwise healthy 
business portfolio. This study also found that size and frequency don't matter. It is often 
expected that a big deal, in proportion to the size of the company, would generate more 
value than a small firm; after all, a big deal can in principle generate bigger synergies. 
But as long as the stock market expects average deals to create no value for shareholders, 
the greater risk of value destruction may cancel out in the eyes of investors, at least the 
potentially greater synergies of a larger deal. It is also expected that companies doing 
deals frequently would create more value with each deal, since these experienced 
companies would be skilled at completing deals and at managing the post merger 
integration process. In fact, experienced companies seem to enjoy no special advantage. 
Perhaps investors recognize that these companies are better at doing deals and thus 
expect the companies to do an average number of them, with above average execution, in 
the future. If so, these superior deal-making skills would be embedded in the pre-
21 
announcements stock price and 't up in the market's reaction to a given deal 
announcement 14. 
A by Business Week ls 6]% destroyed their shareholders' 
year after their deals, the losers' percentage points below 
their industry peers. The gains of the couldn't make up for the buyer's 
average return was 4.3% below Standard and 
500. The worst deal according to WebMD COrp16 
a bid to buy Medical Manager Inc., for $3.2 
billion stock. The 48% premium quickly company limped 
health-care peers as doctors and at using WebMd's 
lead to an unsuccessful merger or the synergy 
a major reason for failure of lack of a 
post to deliver on synergy and control. Firms must plan at 
The of planning can be attributed to are 
seldom concrete about what form synergy will take and do not try to 
the with This is why it is important that try 
to estimate and at an acquisition. There is also the of a 
14 "Deals that create value", 
15 Business Week focused on deals at least w0l1h $500 million. eliminating any in which the buyer offered 
less than 15% of its market The average an amount equal to 47% of its own 
market value. 
16 Then known as 
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lack of accountability. Many people want to be involved in and lay claim to the credit 
when acquisitions are announced. Far fewer of these people want to be held responsible 
for the post-acquisition work of delivering on the promises made at the time of the deal. 
The criticism applies not only to the managers of the acquiring and target firms, but to 
their investment bankers as well. 
Perhaps one of the most significant reasons for merger failures can be attributed to 
culture shock. This is something that gets better with time. A firm acquires a culture over 
time that helps it attract and keep its employees. When firms merge and try to 
consolidate, their cultures are likely to come into conflict. If not managed right, one or 
both firms will face employee flight and loss of morale. This problem becomes more 
serious as firms get larger and the cultural differences run deeper. Another reason for 
merger failure is the firm's failure to consider extemal constraints. In valuing control, we 
assumed that firms making poor investments would be able to raise their retum on capital 
and become more productive. This is not always easily accomplished and may require 
painful decisions about employee layoffs. In an unconstrained free market, these actions 
can be carried out with significant emotional and economic pain to those involved. More 
realistically, firms have to deal with unions and govemment that may not take kindly to 
these actions. In such cases, the firms may be constrained in terms of implementing the 
actions it had planned to take. 
Ego of the managers is another contributor to the failure of mergers. In most mergers, 
the managers at the top of the combining firms have to co-habit and share power. As a 
result of this, power struggles often arise between the chief executives of the combining 
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finns. We discussed how a premium can be a reason for a ure. Even 
best acquisitions will stockholders if acquiring pays too for 
acquiring a publicly traded finn, the acquirer has to the market 
a premium, to the extent that market might already incorporate the 
or control, the premium is driven up by rival bids 
difficult to avoid the winner's curse. may why 
private firms, the premium is not added to a market price, are more 
",,,,,,,,-,u than acquisitions publicly finns. 
plus 
of the 
it 
of 
to 
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V -Empirical Analysis 
In this section I will try to answer these questions in relation to pre merger conditions. 
I. How does the value of the merger determine success of a merger? More 
specifically I look at the issue of whether a big merger increases the chance of a 
merger being successful. 
2. Does a higher earnings per share lead to a higher chance of success of a merger? 
3. Does a higher Asset-Income ratio help in determining the success or failure of the 
merger? 
4. Does Debt-Income ratio Increase the probability of a success or failure of a 
merger? 
1 feel that the higher the value of the merger, the more chances there are for the merger to 
fail. This fact can be assumed from past historical performance and also from existence 
of operating economic efficiencies. Positive earnings per share in my opinion will lead to 
a better merger success. This also holds for my other factor, Asset- Income ratio. 
Data: 
My data source for this paper has been varied and diverse. Firstly, I randomly collected 
eighteen companies who had participated in merger activities in the years 1998 and 1999. 
I was specifically interested in the fifth wave to get a better representation of our present 
economy_ Also, since I look at the pre-merger conditions, my choice of the merger dates 
guarantees availability of data from 1990 till the merger date. This will allow me to look 
at the long-run pre-merger conditions that determine the success of a merger. 1 collected 
25 
my sample of companies 
information on each of 
Stockval. 
Methodology: 
First, I look at the company 
success or a failure. I look at ""."""r<> 
company, the stock price movement 
journaL Then I 
looking at various financial databases such as 
a merger is a 
as the growth of the 
of company in the 
industry.17 In the table I indicate a success by a ure by a O. this I 
calculate the earnings per share, the ratio and the 
measures over the pre-value for pre-merger year. I then took the of 
I compare these measures for the success and companies. 
Finally, I estimate a linear regression model with (I, 0) as the 
variable. The explanatory or independent variable I 
debt-income ratio, average asset-income ratio, average per 
Analysis: 
my four variables for each of the random 
are all pre-merger values. The 
is 1.3017. The table shows that GM 
the highest average EPS. Six companies 
and the remaining have below average earnings 
17 Please see attached table A in the appendix section. 
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per The asset ratio for the companies is ';''''' .. V"''T·"''T.J. We see that 
has the Asset-Income -14.92 Bank of America has the highest 
Asset-Income ratio of 104.7026. Only three companies an 
than the The high asset income could of 
America's figures. On observance Debt-Income ratio we see that 
number is 15.3367. Citigroup has the highest Debt to Income of 
which is by a low of -3.667 by Deere and Again only three companies 
a higher debt -Income ratio than and fifteen companies a lower 
figure the Debt-Income ratio. 
l. 
Avg EPS Asset Income Debt/Income Success/Failure 
Caterpillar 1.0225 7.8819 3.034 1 
CVS 0.3416 10.69 2.54 
Deere 1.235 -14.92 -3.667 0 
Duke 1.201 20.69 7.134 0 
GM -0.785 17.8034 7.4923 
Hertz(ford) 3.066 38.11 11.99015 
Intel 0.455 2.791 0.2218 1 
JCP 2.612 16.629 9.604 0 
McGrawHili 1.0633 32.5 10.7 
Sun 
Microsystems 0.095 2.64 1.109 0 
Albertson's 1.31889 17.072 7.8567 1 
AT&T 4.89 87.9607 15.9104 0 
Kroger 0.3411 13.819 17.597 
SAC 2.465 104.7026 0.16629 1 
Citi 0.85875 22.27 177.975 0 
0.79 7.704 1.2655 0 
XOM 1.1344 13.488 1.6061 0 
Inti Paper Co 1.326 12.967 3.527 1 
Average 1.30169667 23.04436667 15.33679111 0.555555556 
Table 2 presents the 
Table 2. 
Average 
Value 
Success 9.19258 
Failure 33.4817375 
see that the 
EPS 
1.061439 
1.60201875 
success 
25.83369 
19.5577125 
$9.] ion. Whereas the companies that 
$33.4 Billion. I was expecting this to 
to faBed mergers. Higher earnings per 
expecting that a higher earnings would lead to "u~~'"''"';'''' 
I was expecting successful mergers to have a 
consistent with the results as the successful 
compared to an asset-income ratio of I 
had a higher debt-income 
ratio of compames . 
.. .,,,,.,...,.n Equation: 
groups of the 
Long Term Debt-
Income 
6.512524 
26.367125 
an merger value of 
have a much larger average 
merger value often 
I was 
This was not the case. 
was 
ratio of 25.83 
On the 
to debt-income 
now move to equation. I look at the factors success of 
a 
are 
18 Y=bx 
dy/dx=b>O => A 
=b<O =>A 
regression framework. I ran several "A(',"A"" 
The results of the regression are listed below. IS 
value of X increases the chance of success. 
vallie of X will lead to failure. 
Therefore if b<O success is related 10 the vallie of merger. 
Column one, the regression model value of the is 
on the success The coefficient value of the merger is -0.007. 
The t-statistic is which is statistically This negative means 
that higher the the merger and chances 
of success 
Table 3. 
Final 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
0.697306 0.666983 0.511142 0.60292506 0.755204 
(t-Stat) 5.084477 3.805957 3.212597 4.67504079 4.86627 
Value -0.00709 -0.00966 
(t-Stat) -1 -2.21915 
EPS -0.23019 
(t-Stat) -2.0655 
Asset 
Income 0.001927 0.0132 
(t-Stat) 0.442607 2.505336 
Debt 
Income - 0.00308862 -0.00073 
(t-Stat) -1 -0.25333 
two, presents regression model earnings 
are on the success failure . The coefficient 
is -0.0856. The is -0.881 which is statistically insignificant. 
Column three, presents regression model ratio of 
companies is on the success failure The asset-
variable is .0019. t-statistic is .442 which is statistically 
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/ 
umn presents the regression model 
is regressed on the success 
debt-income ratio of 
coefficient of the debt-
which is statistically insignificant. nl'n,tTIP variable is -0.00308. The 
simple bivariate 
insignificant. However, 
is 
are coming out to be statistically 
can misleading because it omits 
other characteristics that might success and failure of the merger. So it is more 
appropriate to analyze the problem in a framework. This analysis is done 
running the regression model 
success failure index on 
asset-income ratio, and 
statistically significant. 
statistic is -2.21, which is 
the more 
merger mat not nec~es:sar'lI 
as in the above table. model we 
average earnings 
_tr.,,,,,,cnA ratio. Most of the 
of the value of the merger is -0.0096 
significant. This means that the 
it to fail. This confirms my hypothesis 
to success. 
t-
The coefficient variable is 0.01 t-statistic is 
2.505, which is significant. This means that the ratio, 
higher the success of the merger. This hypothesis 
that a ratio increases the chances of a success a rnA,..OC'>,.. 
Debt income ratio is -.00073. The 
not This variable has a correct 
nr>,,,....,,,,. ratio the lower the chances of success. it 
which is 
the value of 
to our findings in 
30 
The the earnings per in model 5 is -0.23 and the t-statistic is -
This not my earlier hypothesis a higher earnings share will 
lead to a success. I plan to analyze in future study. 
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Conclusion and Summary 
The objective of this thesis was to detennine if certain pre-merger factors will lead to the 
success or failure of the merger. While my analysis of asset-income ratio, debt-income 
ratio and merger value was consistent with my hypothesis, my hypotheis of the debt-
income ratio was not. My analysis took into account these four factors (asset-income 
ratio, debt-income ratio, merger value and earnings per share), prior to the merger until 
1990. Through statistical analysis I found that the t-statistic of the merger value, asset-
income ratio and earnings per share were significant. The debt income ratio was however 
insignificant. The final conclusion is that a higher value of merger leads to a failure, a 
higher asset-income ratio leads success and a higher debt-income ratio leads to failure of 
a merger. 
In the first part of the paper I write about the background on mergers and acquisitions. 
present to the readers the different types of mergers and how the tenns are 
interchangeably used in the street. I then describe the different waves of mergers and 
acquisitions and the historical significance of each wave. This historical briefing on 
mergers was a crucial introduction for the readers before I could analyze my hypotheis 
about the fifth wave. I write about the different industries and the origin of mergers in the 
first wave beginning in J 897. The fifth wave represents infonnation for my empirical 
analysis which still continues. 
In the next part I discuss the reasons for mergers and acquisitions. Here, I present the 
various synergies that can be achieved including operating synergy, financial synergy and 
32 
diversification. I write about hubris, which is a unfavorable reason 
for to take place. 
next section why mergers acquisitions I take past 
research into consideration. This can summarized that pre-merger 
and implementation this strategy is Culture shock lack of pos-
from past accountability are some of the reasons for 
research also that the 
move into new 
I existing 
research. I want to look at 
the future. 
The next illustrates my 
deals of an "expansionist" program 
new distribution channels to their 
of mergers and in future 
per Share pre TYI"'r('f~'r conditions 
analysis with respect to the 
ratio and the Debt-Income ratio. I my data 
source and 
information. 
use databases such as from which I have derived my 
my methodology I go on to show calculations 
ratios and I chose. In analysis section, I the 
success/fail ure and average values the successful and companies. I 
present my multivariate regression framework and the of my findings. 
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Weston, In 
Date and in after the 
Change in 
DaM Original($) Current($) 
CVS 11 19 -1 
11998 0 66% 
998 0 
GM 7/10/1999 55 37.27 
28 10.9 
Intel 7/1 
JCP 0 
McGraw Hill 1 51 
0 10.41 3.74 
Albertson's Apr-99 1 18.61 
0 1 
Kroger 1 15 
BAC 1 68% 
Oct-98 0 43.45 1 
Oct-99 0 51 24.18 
XOM 0 
Inti Paper 1 
Table B 
Multiple R 
R Sauare 
R 
Standard Error 
ANOVA 
Total 
value 
asset-income 
with 
0.288989019 
0.431144087 
18 
df 
4 
13 
35 
-0.009658304 
-0.230194716 
0.013199645 
-0.000725997 
4 
2.027936535 0.506984134 
2.41650791 0.185885224 
0.155191568 
0.004352249 -2.219152555 
0.11144723 -2.065504156 
0.005268613 2.505335837 
0.419933201 1.09047507 0.419933201 1.09047507 
-0.019060764 -0.000255844 -0.019060764 -0.000255844 
0.05941052 -0.470961771 0.010572339 -0.470961771 0.010572339 
0.026322537 0.001817501 0.024581789 0.001817501 0.024581789 
0.80397676 -0.00691 0.005465264 -0.006917257 0.005465264 
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Table C Regression Results with Model Value. 
Value of Merger 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.415036115 
R Square 0.172254977 
Adjusted R 
Square 0.120520913 
Standard Error 0.479509305 
Observations 
ANOVA 
Regression 
Residual 
Total 
Intercept 
X Variable 1 
18 
df 
16 
17 
Coefficients 
0.697305689 
-0.007091847 
SS MS 
0.765577674 0.765577674 
3.67886677 0.229929173 
4.444444444 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
0.137144043 5.084476679 
0.003886527 -1 .82472571 
F 
3.329623916 
P-value 
0.000110412 
0.086770883 
\. 
Significance F 
0.086770883 
Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
0.406573371 0.988038008 0.406573371 0.988038008 
-0.015330915 0.001147222 -0.015330915 0.001147222 
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Table with 
Share 
R 0.21511497 
AN OVA 
Residual 
Total 
x 
0.04627445 
-0.013333397 
0.514707455 
1 
1 
16 
0.666982774 
-0.085601524 
0.205664223 
4.238780221 
t 95% 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
0.17524706 3.805956991 0.00155309 0.295475686 1.038489861 0.295475686 1.038489861 
0.097154423 -0.88108725 0.391314262 -0.291559654 0.120356607 -0.291559654 0.120356607 
E 
Total 
x 
R 0.109980453 
0.0120957 
R 
0,049648319 
18 
dt 
1 
16 0.274417861 
0.442606777 -0.007303681 0.011158284 0.011158284 
F with 
Income 
Statistics 
R 0.247635425 
Residual 
Total 
R 
X Variable 1 
0.061323304 
0.00265601 
0.51 063051 9 
18 
16 
0.602925064 
-0.003088619 
0.272548016 
4.171896428 
Error 
0.128966803 
0.003020992 
MS F 
0.272548016 1.045272415 
0.260743527 
t 
4.675040792 0.000253495 
Significance F 
0.321808977 
Lower 95% 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
0.329527717 0.876322412 0.329527717 0.876322412 
-1.022385649 0.321808977 -0.009492836 0.003315597 -0.009492836 0.003315597 
